Your constitutional right to privacy · Arizona
Warrantless. Suspicionless. Constitutionally suspect.
Flock's cameras automatically record vehicles passing their locations — plate, vehicle, time, and place — for large numbers of people who are not suspected of any crime. As those records accumulate across a growing network, they can reveal patterns of travel, association, and routine. DeFlock Arizona believes this suspicionless collection and search of aggregated movement data raises serious questions under Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution — and no Arizona appellate court has yet decided the issue.
Does this violate Arizona's Constitution? We believe it does.
Arizona's Constitution contains an express privacy protection the Fourth Amendment lacks. No Arizona appellate court has yet decided how it applies to a large, searchable ALPR network — but here is the argument that it should.
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
— Arizona Constitution, Article 2, Section 8
Why we think Flock's network is constitutionally suspect
- Arizona's clause is textually different. It protects your "private affairs" — language the Fourth Amendment doesn't contain. Arizona courts generally apply similar state and federal search protections, but have recognized stronger state protection in certain contexts, most clearly for warrantless entry into the home. (See State v. Mixton, 2021; State v. Hernandez.)
- Your movements can be your private affairs. Where a person drives over time can reveal their doctor, their church, their lawyer, their partner, the protest they attended. Aggregated plate reads can rebuild that picture.
- Collection happens without suspicion. Flock doesn't watch a specific suspect under a warrant. Its cameras automatically record vehicles passing their locations — including people not suspected of any crime.
- A vendor contract is not, by itself, constitutional authority. Article 2, Section 8 allows intrusion only with "authority of law." The unresolved question is whether officers may collect and search aggregated location records without a warrant, individualized suspicion, or another legally sufficient basis.
- The Supreme Court's reasoning points this way. In Carpenter v. United States (2018), the Court held that acquiring extensive historical cell-site location records was a search, because the aggregated data created a detailed chronicle of a person's movements. Flock is technologically different, and the Court has not decided an ALPR case — but Carpenter's reasoning raises serious questions as ALPR networks grow larger, more connected, and more searchable.
- Courts are still working this out. Commonwealth v. McCarthy (Mass. 2020) upheld a narrow deployment but warned that a sufficiently extensive network could trigger constitutional protection. Commonwealth v. Church (Va.) rejected a warrant requirement on a limited record — a few images over minutes. In United States v. Yang, the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the larger question on standing grounds. None of these approved a large, persistent, searchable network.
Last reviewed August 2026. This is the constitutional argument as we see it — not a court holding, and not legal advice.
What's established, what's disputed, what's undecided
A credible case says exactly what is proven, what is contested, and what the courts have not yet answered. Here is that honest accounting.
✓ Established
- Flock cameras automatically photograph passing vehicles and record the plate, vehicle characteristics, time, and location.
- Most vehicles recorded belong to people not suspected of any crime.
- Records are retained — Flock's default is 30 days, with the actual period set by agency policy, contract, and local law — and can be searched by authorized users.
- Depending on sharing settings, some searches can reach data collected in other jurisdictions.
⚖ Disputed
- Whether accumulated reads amount to the kind of aggregated tracking Carpenter was concerned with.
- How broadly data is — and should be — shared across agencies.
- Whether current retention, access, and audit practices are adequate.
? Undecided
- No Arizona appellate court has ruled on whether a large, searchable ALPR network violates Article 2, Section 8.
- Courts elsewhere have split on narrower ALPR facts; none has squarely approved a persistent statewide network.
- The answer likely turns on scale, retention, coverage, search duration, sharing reach, and how many sightings are actually retrieved.
Last reviewed August 2026. Not legal advice.
"People take photos in public all the time." Here's the difference.
True — and that's legal, and fine. Mass automated tracking is a completely different animal. Here's the plain-English breakdown.
📷 A photo in public
- One moment, one place, one person taking it.
- You can see it happening.
- Not automatically tied to your name.
- Nobody keeps a searchable diary of everywhere you drive.
- It ends the second the shutter clicks.
🚨 A Flock camera network
- Automatic and always on — it records around the clock.
- Captures plate, vehicle, time, and location. Police can use separate law-enforcement and motor-vehicle databases to link a plate to a registered owner.
- Reads are stored in Flock's cloud platform; depending on agency settings and sharing relationships, authorized users may search data collected outside their own jurisdiction.
- Retention is set by policy and contract — Flock's default is 30 days — long enough to reconstruct patterns of travel.
- Everyone passing an operating camera is recorded, whether or not they're suspected of any crime.
- A database search can pull recorded sightings from accessible cameras during the retention period, potentially revealing travel patterns across jurisdictions.
🏠 A camera on private property
- A doorbell cam or shop camera watches its own porch or lot.
- Owned by a person or business protecting their own space.
- Points at one spot — not tracking the whole city.
- Not, by itself, a police-searchable movement database.
- The catch: when an owner shares data or access with law enforcement through a connected platform, that camera can become part of a larger investigative network. The exact access depends on the product, agreement, and sharing settings.
A public photo is a stranger glancing at you on the sidewalk. A dense ALPR network is closer to a stranger noting your car each time it passes a camera, keeping those notes, and letting the government search them later — without a warrant or any suspicion that you did anything wrong.
Flock in practice: documented misuses
The constitutional concern isn't hypothetical. These are documented, reported cases of ALPR networks being misused — each one linked to its source.
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A woman's abortion tracked across ~83,000 cameras
In May 2025, a Texas sheriff's deputy searched roughly 83,000 Flock cameras nationwide for a woman who had a self-managed abortion. The office first described it as a missing-person welfare check; records showed it was part of a death investigation.
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Informal ICE access through local police
Despite Flock's policy and an Illinois law barring immigration use, local and state police ran more than 4,000 Flock searches for immigration reasons between June 2024 and May 2025 — effectively giving ICE informal access to cameras across thousands of communities.
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Officers using the system to stalk partners
At least two dozen officers nationwide have allegedly used ALPR systems to track romantic partners or exes — the bulk of cases since 2024 — according to an Institute for Justice analysis and subsequent reporting.
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Cameras installed without permits
Flock has repeatedly installed cameras on public rights-of-way without required permits. South Carolina found more than 200 unpermitted cameras and imposed a moratorium in 2023; other states flagged similar violations.
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Cameras left exposed on the open internet
Independent security researchers found dozens of Flock cameras and admin or debug interfaces exposed online with no password, letting anyone view, download, or delete footage.
These are third-party reports, linked to their original sources. Last reviewed August 2026.
What we do
The mapping is a tool, not the mission. The mission is holding the line on a constitutional right.
Make the constitutional case
Break down, in plain language, why suspicionless ALPR dragnets collide with Arizona's Article 2, Section 8 right to privacy.
Document the spread
Mapping where these cameras are is one tool we use to prove the scale is real, growing, and worth everyone's attention.
Push for accountability
Give residents, journalists, and lawmakers what they need to question, restrict, and end warrantless tracking.
The map
Mapping is one tool in the fight — not the point of it. Seeing the scale makes the constitutional problem concrete. DeFlock Arizona contributes to the national DeFlock project, which maps reported ALPRs using open data from OpenStreetMap.
Opens deflock.me in a new tab.
Map data is crowdsourced and provided as-is. Reported locations may be outdated, incomplete, or mislabeled, may misidentify the vendor or device, and do not by themselves establish who owns or operates a camera, or whether it is currently active.
Get involved
You don't need special skills — just observation. Here's how to help.
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Spot a camera
Watch for ALPRs on traffic poles, near intersections, and at neighborhood entrances. They're often small cameras with a solar panel and a distinctive angled housing.
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Note the location
Record the exact spot — a nearby address, cross streets, or GPS coordinates. A photo (taken safely and legally from public space) helps.
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Report it
Add it to the map or send it to us and we'll help get it documented.
Frequently asked questions
What is an ALPR?
An Automated License Plate Reader is a camera system that captures license plates, timestamps, and locations of passing vehicles. Networked together, ALPRs can reconstruct where a vehicle has traveled over time.
Has a court ruled that Flock is unconstitutional?
No. No Arizona appellate court has decided whether a large, searchable ALPR network violates the state Constitution, and courts in other states have split on narrower ALPR facts. DeFlock Arizona presents the constitutional argument — not a court holding. Nothing here is legal advice.
Is documenting cameras legal?
Photographing things in plain view from public spaces is generally legal in the United States. Always stay on public property, don't trespass, and prioritize your safety. DeFlock Arizona does not condone tampering with or damaging any equipment.
Who runs DeFlock Arizona?
We're an independent, volunteer-run community project focused on surveillance transparency in Arizona. We contribute to the broader DeFlock effort.
How do I get the data?
Reported cameras are contributed to open datasets via OpenStreetMap, which anyone can access, download, and build on.